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DAVID S. MASON 
MEMBERSHIP OF THE POLISH UNITED
 
WORKERS' PARTY*
 
The Polish United Workers' Party, like the CPSU, has faced a dilemma in 
its attempts to control its growth. 1 The problem is in maintaining its leading, 
elite role while remaining fairly representative of the population, or at least 
of the working class. The difficulty in maintaining this balance has been 
compounded by the Party's changing image of itself and its role. The Party 
Statutes adopted at the Third Party Congress in 1959 defined the Party as 
"the vanguard of the working class, the highest fonn of its organization, the 
guiding force of the socialist revolution."2 By 1971, the Party's special rela­
tionship to the working class was not considered as important. The PUWP 
was seen as "occupying a special place in the system of organization of 
Polish society" and striving for "optimal harmonization of the interests of 
the various classes and strata."3 Still, however, the working class continues 
to constitute the "social base of the party. "4 
The Party must keep itself reasonably small, in order to maintain its elite 
position. But it is also continuously seeking to expand its membership in 
areas where it feels it is weak (for example, among farmers) and ~mong 
those sectors of society where it feels it should be heavily represented, such 
as teachers and trade union leaders. These two contradictory tendencies 
bring forth the necessity of the purge, which eliminates from the Party ranks 
the undesirables. As an authoritative study on the role of the Party admits, 
"the process of cleansing the Party is not, and can never be, completed."5 
" This article was written in 1979 and revised slightly in 1981 with more recent data. The post­
script was written in December 1981. 
I For a discussion of this problem in the Soviel contexi. see Darrell Hammer. ''The Dilemma 
of Party Growth," Problems o/Communism. Vol. XX, No.4, July-August 1971, pp. /6-21; and 
T.H. Rigby, "Soviet Communist Party Membership Under Brezhnev," Soviet Studies, Vol. 
XX VIII, No. ], July 1976, pp. 317-37. 
2 III Zjazd Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robolniczej (Third Congress of rhe Polish United 
Workers' Party), Warsaw, Ksi~ka i Wiedza, 1959, p. 1213. 
) Rocznik Poliryczny i Gospodarczy (Political and Economic Yearbook), Warsaw: Panstwowe 
Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1971, p. 115. 
4 Nowe Drogi, No. I, January 1976. p. 35. 
5 Ludwik Krasucki, 0 kierowniczej roli Partii (On the Leading Role of Ihe Party), Warsaw: 
Ksi~ka i Wiedza, 1959. pA8. Emphasis in the original. 
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The Polish Workers Party (PPR-the communist party before its merger 
with the Socialists in 1948) grew tremendously in the months and years im­
mediately following the war. From a base of less than 10,000 members dur­
ing the war, and some 30,000 by the end of 1944, it grew to 235,000 at the 
end of 1945 and to over a million by December 1948. During that month, a 
"cleansing of the ranks" reduced the membership by some 60,000. The 
merger of the PPS and PPR into the Polish United Workers' Party brought 
the total membership to 1.4 million in 1949 (see Table I). 
Table 1 
PPR and PUWP Members and Candidates 1945-1979 
(in thousands) 
Year Members Year Members 
July 1944 20.0 1959 1018.5 
Dec. 1944 34.0 1960 1154.7 
June 1945 207.0 1961 1306.2 
Dee. 1945 235.3 1962 1397.0 
June J946 347.1 1963 1494.1 
Dec. 1946 555.9 1964 1640.7 
Dec. 1947 820.8 1965 1775.0 
Dee. 1948 955.9 1966 1894.9 
(before unificalion with PPS) 1967 1931.3 
April 1949 1368.8 [968 2104.3 
(after unificalion) 1969 2203.6 
1950 1241.0 1970 2320.0 
1951 1138.4 1971 2254. [ 
1952 1146.9 1972 2262.9 
1953 J2267 1973 2322.5 
Feb. 1954 1296.9 1974 2363.9 
1955 13438 1975 2436.9 
1956 1976 2573.3 
1957 12760 J977 2718.4 
1958 1023 .4 1978 2928.9 
1979 3079.2 
Month is Deeelllber unless otherwise specified. 
Sourees: Norbert Kolomejczyk. PPR /944-]945 (Polish Workers' Party 1944-1945), 
W=aw: Ksillika i Wiedza, 1965, p. 275; PZPR, Komitet Central ny, PPR: Rezolucje, Odezwy, 
lnstrukcje j Okalnih KomitelrJ Cenrralnego. I. 1946-1. 1947 (Polish Worker's Party: Resolu­
tions. Instructions and Circulars of Ihe Cenlral Commillee), W=aw: Ksi~i.ka i Wiedza, 1961. p. 
212; A. Alsler and J. Andrzejewski, "W sprawie skladu socjalnego PZPR" (On Ihe matter of the 
SOCIal composilion of Ihe PUWPl, Nowe Drag" No. I. January 1951, pp. 2315-9; Trybul1a Ludu, 
March 12. 1954. p. 5: "Partia w 1iczbach" (Thc Party in Figures), Nowe Drogi, No.6, June 
1956. p. 102: Roczl/ik Pnli"'cZI/" I Gospodarczy. 1958-1960; Rocznik Starystyczny, 1962-1980: 
Zl'cie Pani" no. 2, February 1980. 
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The Third Plenum of the PUWP Central Committee in November 1949 
marked the end of the period of mass recruitment into the Party. 6 Standard­
ized methods of recruitment by the primary organizations were instituted, 
and the Party began to weed out some of the undesirable elements who had 
joined the Party during the period of open recruitment. As a result, by the 
end of 1951, the Party rolls had been reduced by over 200,000 members. 
According to one study, the heaviest toll in these purges of the early 1950s. 
in Poland as in the other European socialist states, was among the older, 
prewar party members, intellectuals, those of objectionable social origins, 
and those who "sought independence" from the central apparatus. 7 
Party membership policy in the following four years (1951-4) is not clear, 
though the number of members and candidates expanded steadily, almost 
reaching the 1949 size of 1.4 million by 1955. The return of Gomulka in 
October 1956 initiated a reversal of this trend. While the number of those 
purged from the Party in 1955 and 1956 averaged about 50,000, some 
121,000 were dismissed from the Party in 1957. In the period from Decem­
ber 1957 to May 1958, a "verification" of party members resulted in the 
expulsion of over 200,000 members, amounting to sixteen percent of the to­
tal membership of the PUWp.s By the end of the year, some 275,000 mem-
Table 2
 
PUWP Membcrs anu Candidatcs Who Left* the Pany,
 
1948-1977
 
Year Number Year Number 
1948 60.000 1964 36,900 
1950 24.000 1965 41,700 
1954 53.607 1966 44,100 
t955 58.904 1967 129.000 
1956 48,000 1969 50,700 
1957 121.000 1970 53,600 
1958 276.000 1971 142,900 
1959 87.878 1973 59,400 
1960 27.906 1976 49,500 
1961 34,428 1977 57,900 
1963** 43.000 
.. This includes those "erossed off' (skreslono) the Party !iSIS, those "expelled" (wyklu­
czono) from the Party, and those who died. 
.." Figures from 1963 Oil arc es,illlales denved from annual data on Pany membership and 
number of canuidales accepled inlO the Party. 
Sources: Alster, 10(' cil : Nowe Orogl. No 6. June 1956, p. 102; Trl'buno Ladu, January 16, 
1960, p. 3; NOl1'f Orogi. No 5. Mav 1961. p 143: Richard F. Staar, Poland 1944-1962, Balon 
Rouge: Louisiana Slalc Universllv Press. 1962. p. 170 
• Richard F. Staar, Poland 1944-1962, Balon Rouge: Louisiana Slate University Press, 1962, 
pp. 167-68, 
1 Robert Bass, "East European Communist Elites: Their Character and History," Journal of 
Inlerna/ional A.ffairs,	 Vol. XX, No. I, January 1966, pp. 107-17. 
8 Rocznik Poliryczny i Gospodarcl;y 1959. p. 317. 
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p, 126 and No.6, June 1956, p. 102; Gomullca, op. cil., pp. 463-4; Trybuna Ludu, Mareh 16, 
1960: Zvcie Parlii. No.4. April 1967. p 27 and No 4. April 1978; Roc,nik PalirYCln." i 
GOSI'0darc,,', 1961-1974 
bers had been dropped-the largest annual purge in the history of the Party. 
This verification was followed by an exchange of Party cards at the end of 
1959, the fITst exchange since 1949. As a result of these purges, and the di­
minished recruitment in those years, the Party dropped to a little over a mil­
lion members by the end of 1959 (see Table 2). 
The cleansing of the ranks following Gomulka's return to power was 
complete by the end of 1959, and the Party began to rebuild. The year 1960 
saw the largest influx of candidate members into the Party since 1948 (see 
Table 3). During the next six years, the Party grew steadily, with large num­
bers joining the Party each year, and a relatively small number being 
expelled. 
This period of steady growth and outward calm in the Party was inter­
rupted by the Party's problems of the late 1960s. An exchange of Party 
cards during 1967, aimed at "strengthening the leading role of the party or­
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53,630 
Table 3 
Candidate Members Accepted into the PUWP. 
and Their Social Origins. 1947-1977 
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ganizations, "9 resulted in the dismissal of about 130,000 members from 
Party ranks. While details on Party growth for 1967 and 1968 are not 
known, the 1967 purge seems to have been only a temporary disturbance, as 
the Party continued to grow through 1970. 
The disturbances of 1970, and the replacement of the Gomutka leader­
ship, led to another purge of the Party membership, though not as extensive 
as during 1956-9. In 1971, some 143,000 Party members were dismissed, 
the largest number since 1958. That year, the Party declined in size for the 
fIrst time since 1959. Though data on the size of the 1972 purge are not 
available, it probably was not as large as in 1971, and the Party grew 
slightly in that year. By 1973, the normal pattern of recruitment and expul­
sion seems to have been reestablished. 10 
The Party continued to grow very slowly, however, until 1976 and 1977, 
which saw the largest number of candidates accepted into the Party since 
1947-1948. by 1977, the PUWP was the largest it had ever been, both nu­
merically, and as a percent of the total population (7.6%), and of the adult 
population (10.8%). As will be seen below, this increase was a result of the 
intensive and successful drive to recruit more workers into the Party ranks in 
those years. 
Social Structure 
The PUWP, in maintaining itself as the leading and directing force of so­
ciety, as weB as the "vanguard of the working class," has had difficulties in 
maintaining a balance of social classes in its membership. The former role 
calls for bureaucrats and white collar workers; the latter for industrial work­
ers. The Party recognizes this dilemma and keeps records of the social com-
Table 4
 
Population and Party by Social Class:
 
1950, 1960, 1970
 
Social Class (Percent) 
Year 
1950 
Group 
Population 
PUWP Members 
Workers 
28.3 
50.6 
Peasants 
47.1 
14.1 
White 
Collar 
20.6 
28.9 
Other 
4.0 
2.3 
1960 Population 
PUWP Members 
34.3 
403 
38.4 
11.8 
21.0 
42.9 
6.3 
5.0 
1970 Population 
PUWP Melllben; 
37.5 
40.3 
29.8 
11.5 
22.3 
42.3 
lOA 
5.9 
9 Rocvlik. Poliryczny i Gospodarczy 1968, p. 144. 
10 The Sixth Pany Congress in December 1971 added a new featwe to Party membership pol­
icy by requiring "rozmowy" (conversations) with one third of the Party members every year. See 
Rocznik Poliryczny i Gospodarczy 1973, p. 129. 
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11 This contrasts with the Soviet Union, where workers consistently have been underrepre­
sented in the CPSU. In 1959-1961, workers were approximatety 48% of the population, and 
only 34% of the CPSU. See T.H. Rigby, COllllIIUIlisl POrly Membership in Ihe U.S.S.R.. 1917­
1967, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 414. 
J2 Krasucki, op. cit., pp. 48-49. 
IJ For other examples of the Party leadership's concern with the social composition of the 
Party, see Bierut's report to the Seeond Party Congress in Trybullo Ludu (March 12, (954) and 
Gomulka's speech allhe Third Congress in his 0 naszej Pari;; (On Our Party), Warsaw: Ksi;ri.ka 
i Wiedza, 1968, pp. 463-64. 
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position of the total membership, of the new candidates and of those who 
leave the Party. The problem in maintaining social class balance has been a 
threefold one. First, the percentage of workers in the Party has steadily de­
clined over the years, while the working class element in the population has 
grown. The second problem, concomitant to the ftrst, is the disproportion­
ately large and steadily growing representation of white collar workers in the 
Party. The third problem, and probably the least tractable, is the very low 
representation of farmers in the Party. 
The representation of the working classes has received the most attention 
in the Party press. The Party has frequently called for increases in working 
class membership, even though the workers have been overrepresented in 
the Party in comparison to their numbers in the Polish population It (see Ta­
ble 4). But worker representation in the Party has not kept pace with the 
growth of the working class--thus the concern of the Party leadership. 
The problem is obvious from an examination of the statistics on the social 
composition of the PUWP membership (see Table 5). While the percentage 
of workers in the population increased during the postwar years, the working 
class percentage of the Party declined steadily from almost 65% in 1946 to 
under 40%. Though this official figure of 40% is low, it is probably some­
what inflated to suggest that there are more actual workers in the Party than 
their numbers indicate. A more detailed breakdown of the social composi­
tion of the Party for 1958 elucidates this. 12 First of all, the figures normally 
given for "workers" include "agricultural workers" who might more accu­
rately be grouped with the "farmers. " If these two groups are separated, the 
percentage of non-agricultural workers in the Party in 1958 drops from 
41.8% to 37.3%. Further, if one considers only workers "involved directly 
in production," their proportion of the Party membership drops to 25.6%. 
This suggests that in Poland, as in the USSR, the Party often deftnes a mem­
ber as a "worker" even after he has moved from a blue collar occupation 
into a white collar one. 
Before 1960, the Party leadership frequently referred to the necessity for 
more workers in the Party. In a speech to the Central Committee Plenum in 
November 1949, for example, Bierut called for 90% of future recruits to be 
workers and peasants. L3 In the 1960s and early 1970s, perhaps because of 
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Table 5 
Soc,al Composition of Ihe PUWP. 1945-1979 
Social Class (Percent) 
Menial 
Year Workers Peasanls Worken; Others 
1945 01.0 28.1 10.7 
1946 04.7 232 9.3 2.8 
1947 577 21 0 14.1 6.6 
1948 53.6 21 3 17.6 2.3 
1949 55.9 14.7 26.7 
1950 50.6 14.1 28.9 2.3 
1952 48.2 134 36.2 2.2 
1954 48.1 13 R 30.2 2.0 
1950 44.6 128 39.5 3.1 
1958 41.8 I) ) 42.1 3.9 
1960 40.3 11.8 42.9 5.0 
1962 39.8 II 5 43.7 50 
1904 40.2 11.4 43.0 5.4 
1968 402 11.4 43.0 
1970 40.3 11.5 42.3 5.9 
1972 396 10.1 43.9 6.4 
1973 394 10.2 44.2 
1975 41.8 95 41.8 6.9 
1976 44.9 93 
1977 45.0 9.3 34.3 to.8 
1979 46.2 94 33.0 11.4 
Data for most ycars is for Deccmber. 
Sources: KoIomejczyk. op. cit .. p 275: PZPR. 0/' ("II.: Alsler, op. cit., pp. 234-54; '"Liczby 
dOlyczljce skladu Panii ,. (Figures Concerning lhe Composition of the Party), Nawe Dragi, No.7, 
July 1957. pp. 125-7: t'Tie Partit. No. 10, October 1968. and Nos. 1,4, January and April 
1978: Roczrlik Politl'czlI\" i GospodarcZl', 1958-1977: Z\'('ie Partii. 1980. no. 2, p. 14. 
the persistent and seemingly insoluble nature of the problem, the top Party 
leaders less frequently mentioned it. 
After the Sixth Party Congress in 1971, however, there was a renewed ef­
fort to increase the proportion of workers in the Party. Despite these efforts 
and an accelerated rate of recruitment of workers into the Party (Table 3), 
the percentage of workers among the total Party membership continued to 
decline, reaching an all-time low of 39% by 1973 (Table 5). An exchange of 
Party cards in 1975 14 did manage to reverse this decline. But the results 
were apparently considered insufficient, and there were renewed calls to 
strengthen the representation of workers at the Seventh Party Congress in 
December 1975, and especially after the June 1976 workers' protests against 
" The new cards contained mueh more infonnation on the paSI and present PallY activities for 
the holder. 
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food price increases. Thus in 1976, fully 63% of the newly recruited mem­
bers were workers, by far the highest proportion in the Party's history. 
The campaign continued through 1977, with intensive and successful ef­
forts to recruit workers. As the Party monthly noted, "the constant strength­
ening of the position of the Party among the working class is a factor of de­
cisive importance in the realization of the political line and the program of 
the Party. "IS The Party leadership seemed genuinely interested in strength­
ening the links and improving communications between the leadership and 
the workers. Bringing more workers into the Party was the primary mecha­
nism for doing this. 
The difficulty in maintaining a representative proportion of workers in the 
Party seems to be due more to the tendency of workers to leave the Party 
than to the Party's inability to recruit members from this stratum. As Table 3 
demonstrates, the percentage of the new candidates who are workers has 
been much higher than their representation of the total membership. Since 
the percentage of workers among the new recruits was 45% for most years 
from 1957 to 1975 While their representation in the total membership did not 
exceed 40%, it is clear that the workers were not staying in the Party once 
they were recruited. It will be interesting to see if the Party can hold on to 
the massive working class recruits since 1975. 
The supposition that workers are more likely to leave the Party due to lack 
of interest or disillusionment is strengthened by some data on those who do 
leave the Party. In 1960, while only 31% of those "expelled" from the 
"Liczby Party were workers, over 53% of those "crossed off" the Party lists (for 
ii, No.7, failure to pay dues, rransfer party organizations, etc.) were workers. White 
md April collar workers, in contrast, were much more likely to be "expelled" than 
"crossed off. " Of those expelled, almost 60% were white collar workers in 
1960, while only 24% of those crossed off the lists were in that social 
lp Party class. 16 
The Party's policy to increase the proportion of workers in its organiza­
:wed ef­ tion inevitably focusses attention on the overrepresentation of white collar 
~ efforts workers in the Party. While this stratum has never constituted more than a 
able 3), quarter of the population, it made up over forty percent of the PUWP from 
nued to 1957 to 1975. 17 This problem derives from the tendency of the Party, as the 
lange of "leading" organization, to attract and promote leaders, organizers, and bu­
results reaucrats, who generally hold white collar jobs. 
calls to 
sress in 
against " "Jak umacniala si~ partia w biei:~cym roku?" (How was the Party strengthened this year?). 
Zycie Parlii (Party Life). No. II, November 1977, p. 7 . 
• 6 "Stan liczebny omz rozmieszczenie crlonkow i kandydatow PZPR," (The numerical com­
position and distribution of members and candidates of the PUWP), Nowe Drag;, No.5, May 
1961, p. 143. For similar data for 1956, see Trybulla Ludu, March 3,1957, p. 3. 
ivities for 17 [n the Sovie1 Union, white collar workers are even more dominant in the Party, with almost 
50% of the membership in that category. See Rigby, Communist Pany Membership, Joc. cit. 
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The decline in the percentage of workers in the Party was accompanied 
by, and in fact caused by, the steady growth in the proportion of white collar 
workers in the Party ranks. The percentage of white collar workers rose 
from 9% in 1946 to 43% in 1959, and remained about 43% through 1973. In 
the years after 1973, the Party did not always report the percentage of white 
collar workers in its membership. This was during the intensive campaign to 
recruit workers, and reflected the sensitivity of the pany to the fact that 
"mental workers" constituted so large a part of the organization. When fig­
ures finally were reported again in 1978, white collar workers had dropped 
to 34% of the Pany membership, the lowest representation since 1950. 
Much of this decline was due to the increased proportion of workers from 
1974 to 1977. But there appears to be some juggling of the statistics as well, 
in an effort to depress this figure. The percentage for' 'other" social classes 
in the Party, for example, jumped from 6% to almost II % from 1972 to 
1977, suggesting that many of the white collar Party members were shunted 
into this group. 
The dominance of the white collar workers in the Pany is even more evi­
dent from a look at the membership of all the District (Gromadzkie) Party 
Committees in the country. The "mental workers" constitute 57% of the 
membership of these committees, and 82% of the positions of first secretary. 
The source for these data also indicates that teachers are an especially big 
group in both categories, constituting a fifth of all district committee mem­
bers and over a third of the first secretaries. 18 
The biggest problem for the PUWP, however, has been in the representa­
tion of farmers in the Party. In 1950, with almost half of the population en­
gaged in agricultural work, peasants constituted only 14% of the Party mem­
bership. By 1970, the percentage of farmers in the Party had declined to 
1] %, and has dropped steadily since then to 9%. The problem is especially 
acute among private farmers; according to a recent Party source, for every 
1,000 such farms, there were only 73 members and candidate members of 
the Party. 19 
Pan of this decline is due to the gradual reduction in the agricultural pop­
ulation. But the substantial under-representation of farmers in the Party 
stems mosl1y from the reluctance of religious landowning peasants to join an 
atheistic and collectivizing organization. 
With the workers, as seen above, the problem was not so much in recruit­
ing them into the Pany, but in keeping them there once they had joined. 
With the peasants, the problem is a different one. Not only does the Party 
I' Zycie Parlii, No. 11, November 1969, p. 14. 
" Krystyn D~browa, "Potrzeby i moiliwoki poprawy rozmieszcz.enia siJ Partii," (The needs 
and possibilities of improving the distribution of Party forces), Zycie Partii No. 10, October 
1977, pp. 2-3. 
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Part of the Party's problem in trying to increase the number of workers 
and peasant~ in its membership is that it is also trying to attract to its ranks 
20 These data were gathered from the following sources: Kalendarz RoborniclJ' J96J (Work­
er's Calendar), Warsaw: Ksj~ka i Wiedza, 1960, pp. 98-99; Kalendarz RobolniclJ' /963, pp. 
98-99; T. Palim~ka, "Nasza Partia" (Our Party), Zycie Panii, No. 10, October 1968, p. 4; 
Rocznik Polit)'czny i GospodarclJ' J970, p. 171. 
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Table 6 
Education or puwP Members and Candidalcs, 
Selected Yean;, 1951~1978 
Highest Level or EducatIon (Percent) 
Complete Incomplete 
Higher Middle· Elementary·· ElemenlaryYear 
1951 2.0 13.5 42.6 41.9 
1953 2.3 14.6 42.2 40.9 
1955 3.1 17.2 41.9 37.8 
1958 46 19.0 44.9 315 
1961 5.7 20.5 50.0 23.8 
1965 6.5 23.2 54.2 16.1 
1968 7.2 25.8 55.6 114 
1971 8.6 28 2 54.6 8.6 
1973 9.6 295 53.2 7.7 
1976 10.9 31.2 52.8 5.1 
1978 12.0 32.5 51.6 3.9 
• Includes incomplete higher educalion. 
•• Includes incomplcle middle education. 
Sources: "Pania w Liczbach. op. cil., p. 105; "Slan Liczebny," op. Cil., p. 143; Kalendarz 
Robollliczl' /9fJ3 (Worker's Calendar). Warsaw: Ksi~i.ka i Wiedza, 1962, p. 39; Rocznik 
Slall'slycZ/,/\', volumes for 1968-1980. 
have trouble keeping farmers in the Party, it does not seem able to get them 
to join in the fust place. As Table 3 demonstrates, the Party has trouble at­
tracting enough peasants to the Party to bring their proportion among the 
candidates up to even 15%. The exceptions to this seem to be the years of 
the Polish thaw, when Gomulka returned and allowed the decollectivization 
of the farms. 
The tension between the desire to recruit workers and farmers and the ne­
cessity of attracting to the Party the leading elements of society is evident 
from the concentration of Party members among various occupational 
groups. In 1968, less than 13% of all workers and farmers belonged to the 
Party. At the same time 40% of all engineers belonged, 36% of all techni­
cians, 41% of the teachers (up from 20% in 1960), 33% of the scientists, 
and 17% of all doctors and pharmacists. While the Party has included in its 
ranks only about 10% of the adult population, almost 20% of those with a 
higher education belonged to the Party (in 1962).20 
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the leading members of society. These leaders are often the most educated 
and, consequently, the most likely to have white collar backgrounds and oc­
cupations. In this enterprise, the Party has been quite successful. 
As Table 6 shows, the percentage of Party members with a higher educa­
tion has grown by six times since 1951, while the percentage of those with 
less than an elementary education has dwindled from about 42% in 1951 to 
4% in 1978. While the percentage of Party members with a higher education 
has steadily increased since 1951, the most rapid advances occurred in the 
years 1956-1958 and 1970-1972. This suggests that the change in Party 
leadership may attract intellectuals to the Party, at leas! temporarily. By 
1976 the Party was quite wcll educated, with over 40% of the membership 
having completed at least a secondary education. 
The increasing level of education in the Party was due in part to the in­
creased educational level for the whole population. But until 1976 the rise in 
the educational level of the party proceeded much faster than did the in­
creased education for the population. As Table 7 illustrates, the educational 
gap between Party and non-Party members increased significantly over those 
years. In 1955, a Party member was twice as likely to have a higher educa­
tion as a non-Party person; by 1976, he was three times more likely to have 
such an education. After 1976, the gap narrowed somewhat, suggesting that 
fewer highly educated people were joining the party. But by the 1970s, edu­
cation was indeed an important factor in mobility into, and within, the 
PUWP. 
Table 7
 
Percentage or PUWP and Polish Populmion With
 
Complete Higher Education. 1955-1978
 
Year 
Group	 1955 19AO 1970 1976 1978 
Population' 1.5 2 I 2.7 3.6 4.5 
PLJWP Members 3 I 5 3 7.9 10.9 12.0 
* Populalion fifteen years or age and above 
As with social class, the educational level of the Party poses a dilemma 
for its leadership, and has important consequences for its fpture. The Party 
does want to incorporate the best people into the Party, and as the society 
and economy becomes more complex, the educational level of Party mem­
bers inevitably will increase. The Party needs these people to help direct po­
litical, social, and economic development. At the same time, the Party 
wants to maintain close ties with the ordinary Pole, who is not so highly ed­
ucated. As Frederick Frey has pointed out in his discussion of the Turkish 
political elite, the effectiveness of the leadership is largely dependent on the 
extent to which it is representative of the lower political bodies, and the pop­
ulation at large. If it is too much differentiated from the population, it loses 
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touch with the governed. If it is completely undifferentiated, it may not pos­
sess the skills and qualities necessary for leadershlp.21 
Age 
The Party has also had trouble in recruiting young people. The percentage 
of Party members who were under the age of 25 was quite high between 
1954 and 1956 (see Table 8), but it dropped dramatically in the next few 
years. This became a matter of concern to the leadership, with warnings that 
"the Party must begin to replenish its ranks with young people. ''11 A cam­
paign to recruit more young people, begun in 1959, managed to bring some 
back into the Party. After the accession of Gierek in 1970, however, as after 
Gomulka's return in 1956, the percentage of young people dropped off 
sharply, reaching a twenty-year low in 1973. This led to a campaign after 
1976 to recruit more youth into the party coinciding with the effort to attract 
more workers. This did reverse both the decline in the percentage of young 
people in the Party, and the overall aging of the Party membership that 
occurred during the early 1970s. 
Table 8
 
Age of PUWP Members and Candidates,
 
Selecled Years. 1954-1978
 
Percenl in Agc Groups: 
Year Under 25 25-29 30-39 40-49 Over 50 
1954 14.5	 16.6 
1955 15.9	 17.4 
J 956 13 0 
1957 10.0 
1958 6.8 
1960 8.6 17.4 )38 18.7 21.5 
1965 90 15.9 33.7 21.6 19.8 
1967 9.5 14.8 33.3 23.5 18.9 
1968 10.9 14.5 32.6 23.9 18.1 
1970 11.1 142 31.3 25.2 18.2 
1971 92 143 30.8 26.5 19.2 
1973 5.6 14.8 28.8 28.2 22.6 
1976 5.7 15.4 274 27.5 24.0 
1978 7.8 15.7 27.6 25.5 23.4 
Sources: "Partia w liczbach," op. cil.; W. Titkow, "Niekt6re problemy rozwoju Partii" (Sev­
eral Problems of the Development of the Party), Nowe Drogi, No. 12, December t958, p. 88; 
Krasucki, op. cil., p. 49; Rocznik Srarysryczny, volumes for 1968-1980. 
21 Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Eli/e, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965, 
p.	 171.
 
22 Krasucki, op. ci/., p. 49.
 
149 
150 The Polish Review 
The young's lack of enthusiasm for the party is also evident from their 
membership in the communist youth organizations, the ZMS (Union of So­
cialist Youth) and the ZMW (Union of Rural Youth). For those in their early 
twenties, membership in these organizations is a requisite for entry into the 
PUWP. Yet in 1960, only 11% of all university students belonged to the 
ZMS, and only 3.8% to the ZMW. Even more telling, the number of stu­
dents in these organizations declines as they continue their education. While 
almost 18% of first year university students belonged to one of these organi­
zations in 1960, only 9% of those in their final year belonged. 2J 
Conclusions 
The Polish United Workers' Party, like all communist parties, has a prob­
lem in trying to maintain two roles: that of a leading organization that repre­
sents the best of society; and that of an organization well represented in all 
parts of Polish society. When it concentrates on the fonner, by drawing into 
its ranks the political and educational elite, it jeopardizes the latter role. 
When it has tried to become more representative of, and represented in, Pol­
ish society, the size of the Party increases and threatens its elite image and 
role. 
The Party has not been well represented among fanners and young peo­
ple, and has had difficulty maintaining an adequate proportion of workers. 
The highly educated and white collar workers have been overrepresented 
consistently, threatening to isolate the Party from the masses. Membership 
growth and policies have been cyclical, with each cycle initiated by succes­
sion to the position of Party First Secretary, in 1948, 1956, and 1970. Prior 
to each of these successions, the Party had grown substantially. With the 
change in leaders came a purge, and then resumption in growth. It might be 
suggested that the larger the Party, the more likely will there be challenges 
to the Party leadership. With a change, of course, the new leader wishes to 
reconstitute the Party to insure its obedience to him. 
If an overly large Party is a problem for the leadership, however, so is an 
inadequately representative one. Party members serve as the main link be­
tween the leadership and the population. After each of the revolts in Poland, 
in 1956, 1970, and 1976, the Party leadership has tried to strengthen these 
links by expanding membership among workers and peasants. The effort has 
not always been successful. But in the most recent campaign, following the 
1976 disturbances, an unprecedented number of workers have been brought 
into the Party. The inevitable effect of this, though, has been to expand the 
membership rolls to their largest ever. This once again poses the question of 
whether the PUWP, with so large a membership, can maintain its elite role, 
and control disaffection within its ranks. 
2J "StaI1!iczebny," op. ell., pp. 13S-39. 
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Postscript 
This article was written in 1979, well before the upheavals in the summer 
of 1980 and since. These disturbances have put unprecedented strains on the 
PUWP and caused major changes in the composition, organization and 
outlook of that Party. The trends in Party membership and composition men­
tioned above continued in the years 1978 through early 1980. As the Party's 
campaign to make its membership more representative continued through 
those yean; the percentage of workers, youth, and women in the Party in­
creased even further. By 1979, the last year for which Party membership 
data has been reported, the percentage of workers in the party was the 
highest since 1954, of young people, the highest since 1971, and of women, 
the highest ever (26.8%). 
The inevitable consequence of this was that the party had grown to its 
largest size ever, even as a percent of the population. By 1979, the Party 
constituted 11.9% of the adult population, 8.7% of the total population, and 
20.5% of those employed in the socialized economy.24 As was the case in 
1948, 1956 and 1970, this rapid growth in Party membership was followed 
by rebellion and a change in leadership. 
The disturbances of 1980 were not, of course, caused simply by the 
growth in Party membership, but this was certainly one of the factors that 
contributed to those events. The Party's determination to expand its mem­
bership no doubt led to a relaxing of criteria for Party entry, and conse­
quently to the inclusion of many "opportunists." The popular perception of 
the Party as being rife with corruption was probably even more true in the 
later 1970s than it had been earlier. The other consequence of expanding 
Party rolls (noted above) was the tendency of the Party to lose the elan, 
qualities, and image of a leading organization as the membership became in­
creasingly large. 
The lack of confidence in the Party was one of the primary themes of the 
surveys conducted by the intellectuals of the "Experience and the Future" 
group in 1979 and 1980. As one respondent in this survey noted, ideological 
arguments and motivations in the leadership had declined, leaving power 
and its benefits as the overriding motive. This, of course, simply reinforced 
the divisions between the Party and society. 25 
The collapse of the Party's perceived integrity is even more evident from 
some of the public opinion survey data on trust in institutions that have been 
reported in the Polish press. A poll conducted by the Center for Public Opin­
ion Research (OBOP) of Polish Radio and Television showed the Catholic 
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Church, Solidarity, and the army, in that order, as the most trusted institu­
tions in Poland. At the very bottom of the list, in fifteenth place, was the 
Polish United Workers' Party.26 A similar poll conducted later among Soli­
darity members in the Mazowsze region showed a similar ranking: Solidarity 
had the confidence of 95% of the respondents; the Church, 93%; the Army, 
68%. The Party, again at the bottom of a list of fourteen institutions, was 
trusted by only 7% of the respondentsY 
The erosion of trust in the Party was accompanied by apparently massive 
defections from that organization. The scope of this is difficult to judge, 
since the Party has released no data on the size or composition of the Party. 
since February 1980. This is contrary to the usual practice of annual or 
semi-annual reports, and suggests that the data are too unreliable, or too sen­
sitive, for public release. But the decline in the size and ideological fervor of 
the Party membership is evident from fragmentary data on Party members 
who are also in Solidarity, or who adhere to the Church. 
Various estimates suggest that in January of 1981, between 1.4 and 1.7 
million of the Party's three million members were also members of Solidar­
ity.28 Even at the Party's Ninth Congress in July 1981, it was reported that 
20% of the delegates were also Solidarity members. 29 
It is likely that many of those Party members who joined Solidarity even­
tually let their Party memberships lapse. In the Mazowsze poll of Solidarity 
members, 1I% of the respondents also belonged to the Party compared to al­
most 17% (i.e. one sixth) from the national poll earlier in the year. If the 
Mazowsze poll is representative of the nation as a whole, and accounting for 
the growth of Solidarity during 1981, this suggests that at least a quarter of 
the Party members who had joined Solidarity had left the Party between the 
beginning and the end of 1981. This is not surprising, given the low level 
of confidence in the Party by Solidarity members; in fact, more of the 
Mazowsze Solidarity members belonged to the Party (11 %) than trusted it 
(7%). 
The other institution competing for the loyalty of Poles is the Catholic 
Church. While most Poles are Catholics, the Party has heretofore maintained 
that involvement in both the Church and the Party is incompatible. Yet sev­
eral articles in the Polish press have asserted that two-thirds or more mem­
bers of the Party are also believers. 3o The growing awareness of this phe­
16 Kullura (Warsaw), June 21, 1981, p. 2. 
"Tygodnik. Solidarnosc, November 20,1981, p. 3. 
28 The lower figure is derived from a public opinion poll reponed in Kullura (Warsaw), March 
1, 1981, in which it was stated that approximately one sixth of Solidarity's 8~~ million members 
also belonged to the PUWP. The higher figure was reponed by Elizabeth Pond in the C/m:slian 
Science Monitor, January 28, 1981. p. 9. 
29 New York. Times, July 20,1981, p. 5. 
]0 See, for example, the claim of Stefan Bratlcowski in iycie Warsz.awy, December l, 1980, 
and a rebuttal in January 8, 1981. 
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nomenon, in combination with defections from the Party ranks, prompted 
the Party to directly address the question of "Believers in the Party" in the 
Party biweekly, and to allow that religion is a "private matter" and that be­
lievers may join the Party, As necessary as this move may have been to stem 
the tide, it can only result in a further erosion of the Party's raison d 'etre. 
The erosion of the membership of the Party and of trust in the organiza­
tion contributed to the Party's inability to cope with the economic and politi­
cal crisis in the country, In frustration with this, in December 1981 Solidari­
ty's national leadership finally called for a national referendum on whether 
the Party should continue its rule. Prime Minister Jaruzelski's response was 
to declare martial law and replace the government and Party leadership with 
military rule, which was promised to be temporary, The crackdown on Soli­
darity was largely intended to preempt more direct Soviet involvement in 
Poland. The military, at least, was a much more popular institution than ei­
ther the Party or the Government. Jaruzelski may have felt that the military 
could more effectively lead the country through the upcoming winter than 
the Party could. 
These were extraordinary developments, For the fiISt time since the estab­
lishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, a communist party was 
no longer in control. The "leading role of the Party" had been the sine qua 
non for political rule in these countries, especially from the Soviet polnt of 
view. The effect of this on the Polish United Workers' Party, as on all the 
East European parties, is bound to be momentous. 
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